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NOTES.
BANKRUPTCY-RIGHT

OF SECURED CREDITOR TO INTEREST ON

novel question in bankruptcy, which has been for some time working its way
through the federal courts, was finally disposed of by the Supreme
Court in Sexton, Trustee, v. Dreyfus, et at. The referee certified
this question to the District Court for the Southern District of New
York: "Is a creditor holding security which is liquidated after the
filing of the petition entitled to interest upon his claim after the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, where the proceeds of the sale
of the security are inadequate to pay the face of the claim?" In
other words, could the creditor subtract the amount realized on
the sale from the amount of the debt plus interest up to the moment
of sale and prove for the balance? This was answered in the affirmative. 2 On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
DEBT SUBSEQUENT TO THE FILING OF A PETITION.-A

'31 Supreme Ct. 256 (1911).
'In re Kessler & Co., 17r Fed. 751 (igog).
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Circuit, the decision of the District Court was affirmed with a
dissent.3 The Supreme Court reversed the decrees of the lower
courts. In view of the fact that this probably settles for all time
the particular point involved and evidently presents a very close
question from the diversity of opinion manifested by the various
judges who have considered the question, it is deemed worthy of
a detailed study.
The section of the Bankruptcy Act of 18984 which mentions
interest is 63 (a). It reads as follows: "Debts of the bankrupt may
be proved and allowed against his estate which are (i) a fixed
liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing
absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition against
him, whether then payable or not, with any interest thereon which
would have-been recoverable at that date or with a rebate of interest
upon such as were not then payable and did not bear interest."
Under the plain wording of this section in the case of an ordinary
unsecured claim, no one can doubt that interest stops at the time of
filing the petition. This is definitely settled in the case of Shawnee
County v. Hurley. 5 At the time of filing the petition against
the bankrupt, he was liable as a surety in a sum certain. A claim
was filed for that amount. Subsequently the principal made a payment which considerably lessened the loss of the claimant. The
question then arose, upon what basis should the bankrupt's estate
be distributed? On the theory that as at law his liability would
be reduced by the payment of the principal, it was argued that the
claim should likewise be reduced. The court pointed out the fundamental error in this argument by showing that a claim in bankruptcy is a claim in rem. It represents an equitable right to such
a share of the property of the bankrupt as its amount at the filing
of the petition bore to the amount of all the provable claims against
that property. It drew no interest after the petition was filed because it was an equitable estate and not a personal claim. On the
other hand, the foundation of the claim" was a right in personam
against the bankrupt, a chose in action. It was measured. by the
terms of the contract and hence any payments by the principal lessened the liability of the surety. It continued to draw interest, and
if ever a suit at law could be brought on it by virtue of a discharge
in bankruptcy being refused, interest subsequent to the petition
could be recovered. This case gives us an excellent conception of
what bankruptcy proceedings are and should serve to clarify much
of the confusion that exists. That it states no new and radical
principles is shown in the case of ex parte Bennet." Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke there said: "Commissioners, after a man becomes a bankrupt, compute interest upon debts no lower than the date of the
'In re Kessler, iSo Fed. 979 (1g9o).

'Bankruptcy Act of i898.
'94 C. C. A. 362 (igog).
a

Atkyns, 5s27 (743).
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commission, because it is a dead fund and in such a shipwreck, if
there is a salvage of part to each person, in this general loss it
is as much as can be expected." The same thought appears in
Sloan v. Lewis,7 a decision under the old bankruptcy law of i867.
Accrued interest up to the time of adjudication, but not interest to
accrue thereafter, was held provable. The reason for naming the
time of adjudication as the moment of time for" interest to stop,
and not the time of filing the petition, was because the wording
of the old act was different from the present one, section i9 of the
former reading: "That all debts due and payable from the bankrupt
at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy, and all debts then
existing but not payable until a future day, a rebate of interest
being made when no interest is payable by the terms of the contract, may be proved against the estate of the bankrupt." Itwill
be seen that the interest allowed in the above case was not expressly
provided for in the act, but the court held that it was impliedly.
We have seen that the rule concerning interest in the case of
unsecured claims has been settled from earliest times, and it has
been uniformly refused after the filing of the petition. What is
there that caused so much doubt in the case of a secured claim?
The argument, in brief, was this: A secured creditor could first
apply his security to interest, when the parties were solvent, under
the ruling in Story v. Livingston. In that case certain lands from
which were arising rents and profits were held as security. And
the creditor was allowed first of all to deduct interest due on the
debt from the rents and to apply any balance toward reducing the
principal of the debt. Now section 67 (d) of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 provides: "Liens given or accepted in good faith and not in
contemplation of or in fraud upon this act and f~r a present consideration, which have been recorded according to law, if record
thereof was necessary in order to impart notice, shall not be affected
by this act." The amendment of i9o3, 1* providing for invalidating
liens acquired within four months of the filing of the petition when
the bankrupt was insolvent at the time, need not be considered here,
as it does not enter into the question. Hence, if interest up to the
time of the sale of the security is not allowed, it takes away a lien
from the creditor, contrary to the provisions of the act. This argument is not without merit and probably would have prevailed in
the absence of strong reasons for not so holding, the chief of which
was the state of the English authorities, where the question had
arisen several times and was definitely settled.
The English cases are reviewed in the opinion of Hand, J., in
the District Court,11 and, he declines to follow them on the ground,
Wall, x5o (1874).
'Bankruptcy Act of 1867.
'13 Peters, 359 (1839).
Act. of Feb. 5, 19o3, amending Bankruptcy Act of i8g8.
"In re Kessler & Co., 171 Fad. 751 (i9o9).
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that the original cases out of which the rule grew, are vague and
ambiguous and a rule arising in such a way should not be followed
blindly. Mr. Justice Holmes comments upon them also, and, in following them, states his reasons as follows: "Our bankruptcy system
is derived from the English and these cases are not interpreting
particular statutes, but are based on the fundamental principles of
bankruptcy. The theory has always been that everything stops at
a given date, and if we allow interest to run on after the filing of
the petition, we are departing from this basic principle." In fact,
under his conception the whole question arises as a result of not
being able to settle matters on the spot, as the old pied-poudre or
market courts did. If that could be done the secured creditor would
sell his security immediately and prove for the deficiency, the question of interest after the petition being eliminated by not permitting any time to elapse in the settlement of the matter. And since
this cannot be done, he sees no reason for allowing the interest, on
the ground that all delay after a reasonable time is caused by the
creditor waiting for an advance in the market, which enures to his
benefit. The most recent expression of opinion in England is, In re
London, Windsor and Greenwich Hotels Company, Quartermaine's
Case."'
While there are no other American cases on the subject under
the present bankruptcy act, there is a decision under the Act of
1867, In re Haake.14 Curiously enough, it is not mentioned by any
of the judges who had the question before them, and Hand, J.,
states that he cannot find that the question has ever been raised
before under any of our bankruptcy acts. The facts were as follows: Haake had borrowed money from the Savings and Loan Society. He gave interest-bearing notes for this, secured by deeding
certain premises to trustees to hold in trust for the payment of
these moneys. A bill of sale intended as a mortgage of a schooner
was also given. On February 14, 1871, he was adjudicated a bankrupt. The rule that only principal and interest up to the time of
the adjudication could be claimed was recognized in the case of an
unsecured creditor. The question was, how is this to apply to a
secured creditor? Hoffman, J., said: "I have been unable to find
a single decision to the effect that the sum for which the property
is held as security is to be taken to be the amount of the principal
with interest only up to the date of the adjudication. The entire
absence of any authority on the subject justifies the presumption that
the claim of the creditor to a full satisfaction of his debt according
to the terms of his contract out of the secured property has been
generally admitted." Mr. Justice Holmes evidently did not feel the
same way about the presumption in the absence of American authority.
Supreme Ct. 256 (i911).
Ui Chancery, 639 (1892).
142 Sawyer, 231 (1872).
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One other point was decided in our princibal case. Interest
and dividends accrued upon some of the securities after the filing
of the petition. Was this sum to go toward reducing the principal
debt and thus cut down the amount of the claim? It was held
that this could be set-off against the accrued interest subsequent to
the petition. Again, the English cases furnished authority, and in
accordance with their rule, Mr. Justice Holmes expounded our law.
Ex parte Ramsbottom. 1' He also suggested this very practical reason for it: "There is no more reason for allowing the bankrupt
estate to profit by the delay beyond the day of settlement than there
is for letting the creditors do so. Therefore, to apply these subsequent dividends to subsequent interest, seems just."
The decision of the United States Supreme Court is undoubtedly in accordance with the theory of the bankruptcy law. But under
the language of our act in regard to liens, an opposite conclusion
would have been supportable, and the only American case hitherto
decided has taken that view of it.
E.S.M.

PARTIAL RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION.--One of the fundamental
principles in the law of real property is that an estate in fee cannot
be created subject to a provision that it shall not be transferred
by the owner. Alienability, in other words, is one of the essential
incidents of a fee simple estate. There is some doubt as to what
is the underlying reason for this prohibition, but it has been said
that if no other reason could be found, public policy would be a
sufficient one.1 On the other hand, it is also generally recognized
that estates can be transferred with a qualified restraint on the
transferee's power of alienation. The only doubt is as to the extent
of the qualification allowed by the law. Cases where the owner's
power of alienation has been partially restricted group themselves
into three classes:
i. Where alienation is limited to certain persons- or classes of
persons.
2. Where alienation is prohibited for a certain time.
3. Where alienation is restricted to a certain method, i. e., by
will. As the same underlying principles apply to all cases on partial
restraints, a thorough investigation of the subject would require a
consideration of the cases in all of the above classes. Such an extended discussion is here impossible, and our inquiry is restricted to
the state of the law on the first of these three classes, that is, where
the creator, usually a testator, fixes the persons, to whom the land
may or may not be aliened. It is worth noting that the decisions
2
themselves draw the lines sharply between the above classes.

Mont. & A. 79 (835).
De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y. 467 C185o) ; Mandelbaum v. McDowell,
29 Mich. 78 (874); Gray, Restraints on Alienation, p. xi.
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The first case flatly deciding the question under consideration
was Doe v. Pearson. 3 This was a devise to two of the testator's
daughters on the condition that, if either one had no lawful issue,
that one should not have the power to dispose of her share except
to her sisters or their children. This restraint was held valid. In
Attwater v. Attwater, 4 there was a devise of land with the condition that, if it be sold at all, it must be sold to one of five named brothers of testator. This was held to be a void restraint on the power of
alienation. In in re Macleay,' there was a devise of land to the
testator's brother on the condition "that he never sell it out of the
family." The condition was held to be valid in an elaborate opinion
by Sir George Jessel, M. R. He reconciles the two prior cases on the
ground that in the former alienation was restricted to an unascertained class, while in the latter it was restricted to ascertained and
named persons. He then says: "The test is whether the condition
takes away the whole power of alienation substantially; it is a
question of substance, not of mere form"; and applying this test to
Doe v. Pearson and Attwater v. Attwater, he concludes those cases
were both rightly decided. Some doubt has been thrown on this
opinion by a later case, but Doe v. Pearson and in re Macleay must
be taken to be the present law of England. 7 The law in Canada
seems to follow these decisions. 8
In this country there have been numerous cases touching this
question directly or by way of dicta. A number of cases, mostly
by way of dicta, however, support the English view,' but the tendency
of authority seems to be opposed to it and in favor of holding such
a restraint on alienation void. 10 No case, however, gives the subject the treatment, which, as a close question, it deserves.
Such was the state of the law, when the question was squarely
presented for the consideration of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
in the recent case of Manierre v. Welling."' Here there was a
devise of land to children and grandchildren of the testatrix on the
condition that the interest devised should cease "if any of the children or grandchildren shall voluntarily or involuntarily alienate or
'Mandelbaum v. McDowell, supra; Re Martin & Dagneau, ii Ont. Law
Rep. 344 (9o6).
'6 East, 173 (i8o5).
4 i8 Beav. 33o
(1853).
'L. R. 20 Eq. Cases, 186 (1875).
'In re Rosher, L. R. 26 Ch. Div. 8o (1884).
'But see Jarman on Wills, 6th ed., p. i49o.
O'Sullivan v. Phelan, 7 Ont. 730 (x889); Re Porter, i3Ont. Law. Rep.
399 (19o7).
'Cowell v. Springs Co., 1oo U. S. 55 (1879); Felt v. Richards, 64 N. J.
Eq. I6 (i9o2); Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 284 (1829):
" Schermerhorn v. Negus, i Denig. 448 (1845); Anderson v. Cary, 36
Ohio St. 506 (i8gi). In Pa. such a restriction is held void for uncertainty;
McCullough's Heirs v. Gillmore, 1i Pa. 370 (184o).
'178 Ati. Rep. 509 (R. I., Jan., Ig9x).
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devise any portion of said land set apart to her or him other than
to some descendants of mine * * * without the consent of all
my descendants." Parkhurst, C. J., prefaced his discussion with
the remark that this was a case of first impression in Rhode Island,
and which, in view of the hopeless confusion in the decided cases,
was therefore worthy of the most careful treatment. After an
exhaustive and critical survey of practically all the cases and rules
on the subject, he comes to the conclusion that such a restraint on
alienation is void. Applying Jessel's test, he holds that the power
of alienation is substantially, and in fact wholly, taken away by
forbidding the owner to alienate to any one except her descendants
without the consent of all the rest of the descendants; that this
leaves only a "possibility" of alienation, which cannot logically be
called a "power" of alienation; and that the power is really in
the "descendants" to determine whether there be any alienation or
not. He admits that Doe v. Pearson is the same case, but holds in
opposition to Jessel, that it was incorrectly decided.
This clearly illustrates the great weakness of Jessel's rule,
which is the uncertainty of result in its application. On exactly
the same state of facts two judges of high authority come to opposite conclusions as to whether the owner has been "substantially"
deprived of the power of alienation. The difficulty is to determine
what facts must be considered as evidence of a substantial deprivation. "What am I to say is the principle? Is it that there must
be a condition, that, if you alienate, you must alienate to a member
of your own family, or that you must look to the number of the individuals to whom the alienation is permitted, or where there are a
number of individuals, to whom alienation is permitted, am I to
inquire whether they are agreeable or likely to be willing to purchase the property to which the condition is attached? * * *
It seems that the adoption of any2 such rule would produce the greatest uncertainty and confusion."1
This weakness being recognized, another rule has been submitted,
which is supported by an eminent authority on the subject,
Professor Gray. It seems to be universally conceded that a restraint
in a devise that the devisee may aliene to any one in the world except a certain person or class is valid. The line is drawn between
this case and our principal case, the rule being stated as follows:
"A condition is good if it allows of alienation to all the world with
if it
the exception of selected individuals or classes; but it is bad
8
The
allows of alienation only to selected individuals or classes."'
line drawn here would seem to be a somewhat artificial and arbitrary one, and a testator might circumvent the rule, perhaps, by
shrewdly framing the words of the devise. However, it has a decided advantage over Jessel's test in being certain in its application.
Pearson, J., in re Roslier, supra.
.
"Williams on Settlements, pp. 134, 135; Gray, Restraints on Alienation,
p. 30.
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Under this rule it would be possible to inform a testator whether
the condition he wished to fasten on future alienation was valid
or not, while under Jessel's rule, unless the proposed restriction
was exactly that of a decided case, the testator could not be assured
of its validity. This rule, it is clear, narrows the field of permissible
restraints on alienation further than does Jessel's. It is also apparent
that it would not fit the English view of the situation, but that is
not necessarily a fatal objection. One reason urged in favor of this
stricter rule is that in America, unlike England, conditions such as
these are not subject to the Rule against Perpetuities. So these restraints should be scrutinized much more severely here than in
England, as otherwise the alienation of property could be tied up
indefinitely.1 4 It has been also urged that the only rational way to
treat these restrictions is to abolish them altogether. The trend
of authority and opinion, as seen from the above brief review, is
distinctly in that direction, due in all probability to the constantly
increasing traffic in lands and the consequent unwillingness of the
courts to check these sales by saddling them with burdensome restrictions. In view of these facts it would seem to be a safe prediction that in the near future it will be impossible for the transferor to prevent his transferee from alienating or devising a fee
simple estate to whomsoever he pleases.
A. S. S., Jr.

"Gray, Restraints on Alienation, p. 30.

